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1 Introduction
Consider an urban population represented by a continuum of individuals uniformly distributed
over the real line that faces a problem of location and nancing of public facilities under its juris-
diction. More specically, a decision is to be made on the total number of facilities to be built,
where to locate them, how to assign each individual to a facility, and, nally, how to split the
burden of nancing of the facilities among the residents. Every resident faces two types of costs:
one is an idiosyncratic transportation cost from their location to the chosen facility, and another is
a monetary contribution to the costs of the facility she uses.
Thus, the group solution for the locational problem described here consists of jurisdiction struc-
ture, which is a partition of individuals into jurisdictions that consist of individuals assigned to the
same facility; facility location in each jurisdiction, and sharing rule that determines individual
contributions to cover the total cost of facilities in all jurisdictions.
In this paper we focus on the search for a stable partition of the entire population into several
jurisdictions.1 In doing so, we impose the principles of eciency and equal share. The eciency
requires that a location of the facility in each jurisdiction is chosen in order to minimize the total
transportation cost of its residents. Since we assume that the transportation cost of each individual
is proportional to her distance from the facility location, the eciency requirement is equivalent
to the majority voting requirement, and each jurisdiction places the facility at the location of its
median resident. As in Jehiel and Scotchmer (1997, 2001), Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Casella
(2001), Haimanko et al. (2005), Bogomolnaia et al. (2005b), we impose the assumption of equal
share, where all members of the same jurisdiction make equal contributions towards the facility
cost.2
We then introduce several notions of stability that are immune to a possibility of groups of
individuals migrating to one of the existing jurisdictions or creating a new one. It is important
1Throughout the paper, we will use the terms jurisdiction structure and partition interchangeably.
2See Le Breton and Weber (2003), Haimanko et al. (2004), Le Breton et al. (2004), Bogomolnaia et al. (2005a)
for alternative approaches to cost sharing mechanisms, and Le Breton and Weber (2004) for a general review of cost
sharing schemes in this context.
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to stress that, while migrating between jurisdictions, all individuals anticipate the median location
of the public facility and the equal share cost mechanism in a newly created jurisdiction. The
most stringent stability notion we consider is what Jehiel and Scotchmer (2001) call admission
under unanimous consent (SAUC). This notion grants every individual the veto power regarding
a possible migration of any group of individuals from other jurisdiction to her own. Obviously,
the admission under unanimous consent severely restricts threats to stability, thus, generating a
large set of stable jurisdiction structures. We then turn to the examination of more permissive
stability threats. One is core stability (CS) where every group of individuals is allowed to leave
their jurisdictions and to create a new one. Another is stability under free mobility (SFM) that
does not allow the members of existing jurisdiction to prevent immigration by members of other
jurisdictions. While it is obvious that both CS and SFM notions are stronger than SAUC, we also
examine a less obvious link between CS and SFM structures and show \almost every" SFM is also
core stable. However, there is one case, namely of jurisdictions represented by intervals of the same
length, where this relation is reverse. One can though that in most of the cases free mobility turns
out to be the most permissive threat to stability.
An examination of stable partitions has to deal with the questions of number, size and com-
position of jurisdictions they contain. In characterization the number of jurisdictions in a stable
partition one has to take into account the conict between increasing returns to scale that favor the
creation of larger groups and the heterogeneity of individuals' locations that support the emergence
of smaller groups. To discuss the size and the composition of jurisdictions in a stable partition,
note that the presence of a sucient number of distant individuals in the jurisdiction may adversely
impact the value of a total jurisdictional transportation cost to the chosen facility location. From
this point of view, the locational heterogeneity could be costly and, for a given size of jurisdiction,
the intra-heterogeneity is minimal when the jurisdiction is an interval. In local public nance,
this qualitative feature describing is referred to as stratication while in game theory it is often
called consecutiveness. Another important feature of jurisdiction structures is inter-heterogeneity
of jurisdiction sizes, or so-called heterogeneity gap in sizes of jurisdictions in stable partitions. We
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show that, unlike in Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and Casella (2001), our stability notions may yield
a stable partition with sharply distinct jurisdiction sizes. Obviously, in the case of non-uniform
distributions (see e.g, Bogomolanaia et al. (2005b) in the nite set-up) the heterogeneity of juris-
diction sizes is a natural feature of the model. What we show is that even the uniform distribution
of individuals' locations may yield stable structures with sharply distinct jurisdiction sizes.3
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and introduces the notions
of stability examined in this paper. In Section 3 identify special jurisdiction structures that sat-
isfy consecutiveness, border indierence, size monotonicity and homogeneity, and examine whether
those properties are consistent with the stability notions introduced in previous section. In par-
ticular, we show that all SFM partitions are consecutive, whereas it is not necessarily the case for
SAUC and CS partitions. Section 4 contains complete characterization results for SFM partitions
and consecutive SAUC and CS partitions. More specically, we establish bounds on the size of
jurisdictions that yield stable partitions (under either SAUc, SFM or CS). It turns out that sta-
ble structures could display a strong size heterogeneity among jurisdictions that form it. We also
establish a somewhat surprising link between SFM and CS (while both are weaker than SAUC).
Namely, every SFM partition that contains jurisdictions of dierent sizes is also CS.However, the
situation is reverse for partitions that consist of equal-size intervals, where every CS partition is
SFM. The proofs of all results are relegated to the Appendix B, which is preceded by Appendix A
that contains preliminary results and remarks.
2 The Model
We consider a society which faces the problem of location, nancing and assignment of its
members to public facilities (hospitals, schools, libraries, etc.). For that purpose, society may
remain as a whole or to be partitioned into several jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction selects the
location for the facility (not necessarily within jurisdiction's bounds) and nances the cost of this
3The heterogeneity of jurisdictional sizes has been examined by Jehiel and Scotchmer (1997, 2001) who consider
a setting where the public goods are dierentiated according to a single vertical dimension (quantity) and where the
heterogeneous individuals are characterized by their willingness to pay.
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facility by collecting tax from the jurisdiction members. Each individual therefore incurs two costs:
the tax (her monetary contribution towards the costs of local facility), and the transportation
cost from the individual's own location to that of the facility. The benet of using the service is
assumed to exceed any potential cost, so no individual would stay from public facilities ensuring
the voluntarily participation of all individuals in the process described above.
We assume that the society consists of individuals uniformly distributed over the interval I =
[0; 1]. Any measurable set S  I of a positive Lebesgue measure (not necessarily an interval!)
could be an admissible jurisdiction. We denote the measure of a jurisdiction S by jSj. We call
jurisdiction structure a partition P = fSig1in of I into a nite number of jurisdictions. We refer
to P with n elements as an n-partition. Slightly abusing the notation, we identify an individual
with her location, so that we will use just t for an individual located at the point t 2 I.
The cost of a facility g > 0 is independent of location and jurisdiction and is divided equally
among jurisdiction members. The residents cover the cost of the facility so that the tax imposed
on every member of the jurisdiction S is
g
jSj . Residents of each jurisdiction face an idiosyncratic
cost proportional to the distance to the facility chosen by that jurisdiction. We assume that the
transportation cost is linear in distance: an individual t 2 S faces the transportation cost jt  sj, if
the facility is located at point s.
The eciency condition implies that every jurisdiction S locates the facility at its median point
m(S), which minimizes the total transportation cost of its members (see Haimanko et al. (2004)).
If a median point is not unique (which can happen when S is not a connected set), then there is
an interval of median points and we assume that m(S) is the midpoint of this interval.
Given the assumptions above, the total cost c(t; S) of an individual t in jurisdiction S is uniquely
by:
c(t; S) = jt m(S)j+ gjSj :
For any jurisdiction structure P = fSigni=1 and any individual t 2 I we denote by St the
(unique) jurisdiction from P which contains t. We will use the notation c(t; P ) for c(t; St), the
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total cost an individual t incurs in the jurisdiction structure P .
An arbitrarily chosen partition of the society could be prone to migrations by some dissatised
groups (measurable sets) of individuals, who, in search for a better payo (lower total cost) will
switch to another jurisdiction, or even to form a new jurisdiction, Our goal is to identify stable
partitions, immune to such migrations. We consider various notions of stability, steaming from
three dierent principles for permissible group deviations (or migrations).
The rst notion allows a group of individuals S to join an existing jurisdiction T whenever all
migrants and all members of the migration target T would benet from the migration move. This
notion of stability is called stability under admission by unanimous consent (Jehiel and Scotchmer
(2001)):
Denition 2.1: A partition P is stable under admission by unanimous consent (SAUC) if there
exists no group S 2 I and a jurisdiction T 2 P , such that c(t; S[T ) < c(t; P ) for all t 2 S[T .
In particular, this implies that no set of measure zero S is allowed to move under SAUC
condition. Indeed, in this case the migration move does impact the the members of T , thus
violating the strict inequality in the denition. Thus, only a group of a positive measure could
present a migration threat under SAUC.
The second notion of stability emerges when a group of individuals is allowed to form a new
jurisdiction, as long as all the migrants become better of. This leads to the traditional core stability
(CS) notion:
Denition 2.2: A partition P is called core stable (CS) if there exists no group S  I such that
c(t; S) < c(t; P ) for every t 2 S.
Since an admissible under SAUC migration is also an admissible deviation under CS, SAUC is
a weaker requirement then CS.
The third possibility is to allow a group of individuals S to join another jurisdiction T when all
members of T would be better without demanding the approval of members of T . The corresponding
notion of stability is called stability under free mobility (SFM).
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Denition 2.3: A partition P is stable under free mobility (SFM) if there exists no group S 2 I,
together with a jurisdiction T 2 P , such that c(t; S [ T ) < c(t; P ) for all t 2 S:
Since SFM does not demand the consent of the members of the host jurisdiction, SAUC is
weaker than SMF as well. The relation between SFM and CS is less obvious. Contrary to the CS
requirement, under SFM the potential migrants have to join an existing jurisdiction and they are
not allowed to form a new one. Nevertheless we will show that, except for the special homogenous
case of partitions that consist of equal intervals, CS is implied by SFM. Thus, CS requirement
is \generically" weaker then SFM. Even more surprisingly, in the homogenous case, the situation
reverses and SFM is implied by CS.
Note also, that unlike in SAUC, both CS and SFM allow for migrant sets of measure zero, or
even for deviating individuals.
To summarize the type of admissible deviations, under all three stability notions, a necessary
condition for a group S to consider a migration is the strict reduction of the after-migration relative
to the pre-migration costs for all members of S. Moreover
 Under SAUC, a deviating group S should join an existing jurisdiction T and make all members
of T better o;
 Under CS, a deviating group S should form its own new jurisdiction;
 Under SFM, a deviating group S should again join an existing jurisdiction, but there is no
requirement on cost reduction for the members of the host jurisdiction.
We now turn to identication of special classes of jurisdiction partitions and their compatibility
with stability notions dened in this section.
3 Classes of partitions
So far we have not imposed any ex ante restrictions on the set of admissible partitions or
jurisdictions. Nevertheless, some special types of partitions play important role in potential ap-
plications, and will be of particular interest to our analysis. We then investigate a possibility
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that the restrictions on partitions we impose are consistent with the stability notions we exam-
ine. The most important type of partitions consisting of consecutive (see Greenberg and Weber
(1986)) jurisdictions, which are represented by intervals in I (which may or may not contain their
endpoints):
Denition 3.1: A partition P of I is consecutive if every S 2 P is an interval.
A consecutive partition P can be given by the sequence of intervals f(xi 1; xigg1in, where
0 = x0 < x1 < : : : xn 1 < xn = 1. We will denote the length of an interval Si = (xi 1; xi) in P
by si. Given that x0 = 0 and xn = 1, a consecutive partition is uniquely dened by the n   1-
tuple (x1; : : : ; xn 1), where 0 < x1 < : : : xn 1 < 1 or by positive numbers s1; : : : ; sn, such thatPn
i=1 si = 1. If no confusion will arise, we use the notation P = (x1; : : : ; xn 1) or P = (s1; : : : ; sn).
An important property of a consecutive partition P is that a peripheral individual, located on the
border of two adjacent intervals in P , namely at points x1; : : : ; xn 1, will be indierent between
locating being in any of these two jurisdictions. Obviously, this property would be important for
the analysis of a potential migration of \almost peripheral" individuals close to the border with
other jurisdictions. We will refer to this property as the border indierence:
Denition 3.2: A consecutive partition P = (x1; : : : ; xn 1) satises border indierence (BI) if for
all i = 1; : : : ; n  1 we have c(xi; [xi 1; xi]) = c(xi; [xi; xi+1]):
Note that a partition P satises BI if and only if the function c(; P ) is continuous on I.
We will also consider a subset of consecutive partitions in which the jurisdiction sizes either
(weakly) increase or decrease from from one endpoint of I to another:
Denition 3.3: A consecutive partition P of I is size-monotone if either s1  s2  : : :  sn or
s1  s2  : : :  sn. (Without loss of generality, we will conduct our analysis for the former
case).
If the inequality in Denition 3.3 turns into equality, the partitions with equal-size jurisdictions
will arise:
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Denition 3.4: A size-monotone partition P of I is homogenous if s1 = : : : = sn. A non-
homogeneous partition (not necessarily size-monotone) will be referred to as heterogenous
partition.
We now establish the link between properties of partitions introduced in this section and our
stability notions. First,
Proposition 3.5: Any SFM partition is consecutive.
However, this conclusion does not hold for other two stability notions we consider. Moreover,
even a consecutive CS (and SAUC) partition may not size-monotone (and thus, homogeneous):
Proposition 3.6: (i) A CS (and hence a SAUC) partition is not necessarily consecutive.
(ii) A consecutive CS partition is not necessarily size-monotone.
In the next section we provide our characterization results for stable partitions.
4 Stable Partitions: Characterization Results
Before proceeding with the characterization of stable consecutive partitions, it would be useful
to have a more detailed examination of tax burden imposed on the members of a jurisdiction in the
partition. Indeed consider an interval S = [a; b] of length s and note that the peripheral individuals
a and b incur the highest total cost within the jurisdiction.4 Their total burden is given by the
value of the \peripheral" cost function 	 dened on <+:
	(s) =
s
2
+
g
s
:
It is easy to see that 	 is strictly convex, attains its minimum at d(g) =
p
2g, and min
s0
	(s) =
	(d(g)) = d(g). Moreover, it decreases for s < d(g), increases for s > d(g), and takes any
value d > d(g) twice (once for some s < d(g), and once for some s0 > d(g)). Thus, s = d(g)
4In the case of closed intervals, two jurisdictions have a common peripheral individual, that could be considered to
be a member of both, whereas in the case of open intervals there could be an individual that belongs to no jurisdiction.
We discuss this technical point in the Appendix A.
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is the \optimal size" of an interval jurisdiction, that minimizes the cost of the most disadvantaged
individuals. Note also that the border indierence condition BI can be written as 	(s1) = : : : =
	(sn). Hence, any partition which satises BI contains jurisdictions of at most two distinct sizes.
Function 	 will play an important role in the proofs of our stability results.
We now provide the complete characterization of SFM partitions. In the multi-jurisdictional
case we determine the bounds for jurisdictional sizes in a SFM partition:
Proposition 4.1: (i) A consecutive heterogeneous partition P into multiple jurisdictions is SFM
if and only if it satises BI, and for each S 2 P we have jSj 2

d(g)p
2
;
p
2d(g)

;
(ii) A homogenous partition P into multiple interval jurisdictions of size s is SFM if and only
if s  d
(g)p
2
;
(iii) The grand jurisdiction I is always SFM.
Given the fact that a heterogenous partition under BI can contain jurisdictions of dierent sizes,
in order to verify whether this partition is SFM, one has to check whether the jurisdictions are
neither too small nor too large. In the homogenous case the verication of only one bound would
suce.
It is worthwhile to establish the link between SFM and CS (to recall both notions are weaker
than SAUC). It turns out that, in general (in heterogenous case), SFM is weaker than CS. \generic"
(i.e., valid in the heterogeneous case) result on the inclusion of the SFM set of partitions into the
CS set. Even more surprising is the fact that the situation is reverse in the homogenous case, where
the set of CS partitions is a subset of the SFM set:
Proposition 4.2: (i) Every heterogenous SFM partition is CS.
(ii) Every consecutive homogenous CS partition is SFM.
We now turn to the examination of SAUC and CS partitions. Even though Proposition 3.6
indicates that SAUC and CS partitions could be non-consecutive, in what follows we concentrate
on the case when only admissible jurisdictions are intervals. Proposition 3.6 also implies if a CS
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(SAUC) partition is consecutive, it need not to be either size-monotone. However, once size-
monotonicity is imposed,5 we obtain sucient conditions for SAUC and CS.
Proposition 4.3: Let P = (s1; : : : ; sn) be a size-monotone partition of I where d
(g)  s1: Then
P is SAUC.
Proposition 4.4: Let P = (s1; : : : ; sn) be a size-monotone partition of I where d
(g)  s1  sn 
p
2d(g). Then P is CS.
To guarantee that a size-monotone partition is SAUC, it is enough to verify that jurisdictions in
this partition are not too small: the smallest jurisdiction should not be smaller then the \optimal"
size d(g). If we wish to impose a stricter requirement of CS, we also have to limit the size of
jurisdictions from above so that the size of the largest jurisdiction should not exceed
p
2d(g).
These sucient conditions allow a wide range of stable structures.
If we further restrict our attention to homogenous partitions, we obtain a necessary and sucient
condition for CS.
Proposition 4.5: (i) A homogenous partition of I which consists of multiple jurisdictions of size
s, is CS if and only if
d(g)p
2
 s  d(g)

1 +
p
2

:
(ii) The interval I is CS if and only if
p
g  1
2 +
p
6
:
Since s = 1n and d
(g) =
p
2g, last proposition allows us to determine the values of n, which,
for given g > 0, admit CS n-partitions. Namely,
if
p
g  1
2 +
p
6
, then 1-partition is CS;
if
p
g  1
n
 pg

2 +
p
2

, where n > 1, then there exists a CS n-partition.
We also provide an alternative version (actually a corollary) of Proposition 4.5 by describing,
for given n, the range of values of g that yield a homogenous CS n-partition.
Proposition 4.6: (i) A multi-jurisdictional homogenous n-partition is CS if and only if
1
n2[2 +
p
2]2
 g  1
n2
:
5To recall, we restrict our examination to the case s1  : : :  sn.
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(ii) A homogenous CS partition exists for any g > 0.
5 Appendix A - Preliminary Results
We start by introducing some notation, lemmas and remarks which will be helpful to prove our
results.
For every jurisdiction S (either a member of an initial jurisdiction structure, or a potentially
deviating group), denote by l(S) = infftjt 2 Sg and r(S) = supftjt 2 Sg its peripheral individuals.
As we argued in the beginning of Section 4, peripheral individuals in any jurisdiction (whether it is
an interval or not). We will assume for every S its both peripheral individuals l(S) and r(S) belong
to S. Of cause, it implies that P , formally speaking, could fail to be a partition (if two jurisdictions
have a common peripheral individual, she is considered to be a member of both). Still, P will be
a partition if we ignore a nite number of points (at most n as the number of jurisdictions in the
partition). All the statements in the paper remain true without this assumption, but its absence
would make the presentation unnecessarily burdened by technical details.6
Let us now extend the notation c(t; S) to the case when an individual t 62 S. In this case, we
write c(t; S) for the total cost c(t; S[ftg) an individual t would incur if she joins jurisdiction S. Note
that, given S, c(t; S) = c(t; S [ ftg) = jt m(S)j+ gjSj is a continuous single-dipped function. For
any partition P , any jurisdiction S, and any individual t 2 I, we dene (t; S; P ) = c(t; S) c(t; P ).
Recall that, whenever a group S is allowed to deviate from P (under either SAUC, CS or SFM), all
members of S must be strictly better o relatively to their cost levels in P . Hence, S can deviate
only if (t; S; P ) < 0 for all t 2 S.
We will use the following remarks and lemmas. Let g > 0 be given so will write d instead of
d(g) for the optimal size of jurisdiction given g.
Remark A.1 The peripheral cost function 	(s) =
s
2
+
g
s
, dened in Section 4, satises the
following conditions:
d	(s)
ds
2

 1
2
;
1
2

for s 2 [pg;+1):
6The proofs in absence of this assumption are available from authors upon request.
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	(s+ a) > 	(s)  jaj
2
for s 2 [pg;+1) and a >  s:
Follows from direct dierentiation and the fact that the convexity of 	 implies 	(s+ a) > 	(s) +
	0(s)a.
Remark A.2. If P is SAUC, then for any Si; Sj 2 P , i 6= j we have m(Si) 6= m(Sj).
Straightforward.
Remark A.3. For any S we have c(l(S); (S); c(r(S); S)  	(jSj)  d and
maxfc(l(S); S); c(r(S); S)g = maxfc(t; S) : t 2 Sg  	(jr(S)  l(S)j).
All inequalities are straightforward except the last one. Assume c(l(S); S)  c(r(S); S). Then
m(S)  m([l(S); r(S)]), and
c(l(S); S) = jl(S) m(S)j+ gjSj  jl(S) m([l(S); r(S)])j+
g
jr(S)  l(S)j = 	(jr(S)  l(S)j):
Remark A.4. If t is a peripheral individual in S, then c(t; S)  min
s
	(s) = d =
p
2g > 1:4
p
g.
If S is a group that violates SAUC of the jurisdiction structure P , then c(t; P ) > d, and hence
jStj 6= d.
Remark A.5. Let P = (s1; : : : ; sn) be a consecutive partition, with si 2 [pg; 2pg]. Then for
any t 2 I we have
c(t; P )  max
1in
f	(si)g  max f	(s) : s 2 [pg; 2pg]g = 	(pg) = 	(2pg) = 1:5pg:
Lemma A.6. Let P = (x1; : : : ; xn 1) be a consecutive partition, with si 2 [pg; 2pg]. If a
group S violates CS of P , then there exist i; j such that maxfjl(S)  xij; jr(S)  xj jg < 0:1pg.
Proof: We can assume l(S) 2 Si = [xi 1; xi] 2 P and l(S)  m(Si). Then:
c(xi; Si)  c(l(S); P ) = c(xi; Si)  c(l(S); Si) = jxi  m(Si)j   jl(S) m(Si)j = jl(S)  xij:
Since, by Remarks A.5 and A.4, c(xi; Si)  1:5pg and c(l(S); P ) > 1:4pg, the conclusion follows.
2
Lemma A.7. Let P be a consecutive partition, satisfying BI. Then for every jurisdiction S,
the function (; S; P ) is a continuous (in fact, a peace-wise linear) function on I, single-dipped,
and attains its minimum at m(S).
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Proof: Continuity follows from BI. For t  m(S) we have
(t; S; P ) = c(t; S)  c(t; P ) = jt m(S)j   jt m(St)j+ gjSj  
g
jStj
= m(S)  t  jt m(St)j+ C1(St) =

C2(S
t); t  m (Si);
C2(S
t)  2t; t  m (Si).
Here C1(S
t), C2(S
t) are constant on each St. Hence, (t; S; P ) is (non-strictly) decreasing on each
interval St\ [0;m(S)]. Thus, it is decreasing on [0;m(S)]. Analogously, it is increasing on [m(S); 1].
2
Lemma A.8. Let P be a consecutive partition, satisfying BI. If no interval can violate CS of
P , then P is CS.
Proof Assume that S violate CS of P by deviating from P and making all its members better
o. Then (l(S); S; P ) < 0 and (r(S); S; P ) < 0, and, hence, by Lemma A.7, (t; S; P ) < 0 on
the entire interval [l(S); r(S)]. But then the interval [m(S)  jSj2 ;m(S) + jSj2 ] can also make all its
members better o, a contradiction. 2
We now turn to the proof of our main results.
6 Appendix B - Main Results
Proof of Proposition 3.5. Assume to the contrary, that P is SFM but not consecutive.
Then there are S; S0 2 P and individuals t1; t2 2 S, t0 2 S0, such that t1 < t0 < t2. Without loss of
generality, we can assume m(S) < m(S0) (see Remark A.2). We have for all t 2 I:
c(t; S)  c(t; S0) = jt m(S)j   jt m(S0)j+ gjSj  
g
jS0j
= jt m(S)j   jt m(S0)j+ C =
8<:
m(S) m(S0) + C; t  m(S);
2t m(S) m(S0) + C; m(S)  t  m(S0);
m(S0) m(S) + C; m(S0)  t.
Hence, c(t; S)  c(t; S0) is an increasing function of t on [0; 1], and so c(t1; S)  c(t1; S0) < c(t0; S) 
c(t0; S0) < c(t2; S)   c(t2; S0). But SFM implies that no individual can improve her fate by
changing jurisdiction. In particular, we should have c(t1; S)  c(t1; S0), c(t2; S)  c(t2; S0), and
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c(t0; S0)  c(t0; S), which contradicts the above inequalities. 2
Proof of Proposition 3.6. (i) Let g = 118 and therefore d
 = 13 . Consider P that consists
of three jurisdictions, S1 = [0; d
   "]S [1  "; 1], S2 = (d   "; 2d   "), S3 = (2d   "; 1  ").
Assume, in negation that a jurisdiction S can deviate from P and to violate CS of P . By Remark
A.4, neither l(S) nor r(S) can belong to either S2, S3 or [0; d  "], since any individual t located in
one of those areas has c(t; P )  d. Hence, S  [1  "; 1]  S1.
Note that for any t 2 I we have c(t; P ) = jt  m(St)j + g
d
 1 + g
d
=
7
6
: So, if S deviates, it
has to be c(t; S) < c(t; P )  7
6
for all t 2 S. But, for " small enough, c(t; S)  gjSj =
1
18"
 7
6
, a
contradiction.
(ii) Let g = 118 and d
 =
p
2
6 . Consider a consecutive 4-partition P = (s1; s2; s3; s4), where
s1 = s4 =
1
6 and s2 = s3 =
1
3 . By Proposition 4.1, part (i), it is SFM, and by Proposition 4.2, part
(i), it is CS, too. However, P is obviously not size-monotone. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.1 (i)\Only if" part. Let P = fS1; : : : ; Sng = (x1; : : : ; xn 1) =
(s1; : : : ; sn) be a consecutive heterogeneous SFM n-partition, n > 1.
Assume that BI condition does not hold. Then, without loss of generality, there exists an
individual xi, i 2 f1; : : : ; n   1g, peripheral for Si and Si+1, such that c(xi; Si) > c(xi; Si+1). But
then for any small enough positive " we have c(xi "; Si) > c(xi "; Si+1), so the interval (xi "; xi)
would benet from migrating to Si+1, which contradicts SFM.
Now, since P satises BI and is heterogeneous, it contains jurisdictions of exactly two sizes, s0
and s00, where s0 < s00 and 	(s0) = 	(s00). To complete this part, it is enough to check that s0  pg
(since 	(
p
g) = 	(2
p
g), s00  2pg follows).
Assume to the contrary that s <
p
g. Then we have s00 > 2pg > 2s0 and s < g
s0
. We can
assume without loss of generality that S1 = [0; s
0] and S2 = [s0; s0 + s00]. We check that the group
T = [s00 "; s0+s00]  S2 would benet from joining S1 = [0; s0], for " such that 0 < " < (s00 2s0)=2
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and " < 	(s00) 	(2s0 + ") (such " > 0 exists, since 	(s00) > 	(2s0) and 	 is continuous).
First, note that jT j = s0 + " > s0, so m(T [ S1) 2 T ; moreover, m(T [ S1) = s00   "
2
> s00   " >
m(S2) = s
0 +
s00
2
. We will now check that (t; T [ S1; P ) = c(t; T [ S1)  c(t; P ) < 0 for all t 2 T .
First,
(s0 + s00; T [ S1; P ) = c(s0 + s00; T [ S1)  c(s0 + s00; P ) = 	(2s0 + ") 	(s00) <  " < 0:
Next, for t 2 T with m(S2) < m(T [ S1) = s00   "
2
 t  s0 + s00, we have
(t; T [ S1; P ) = c(t; T [ S1)  c(t; P ) = (s0 + s00; T [ S1; P ) = 	(2s0 + ") 	(s00) <  " < 0:
Finally, for t 2 T with m(S2) < s00   "  t  s00   "
2
= m(T [ S1), we have
(t; T [ S1; P ) = (s0 + s00; T [ S1; P ) + 2(m(T [ S1)  t) =
	(2s0 + ") 	(s00) + (2s00   "  2t) < 2(s00   "  t)  0:
Thus, T would benet from deviation, which contradicts SFM. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.1 (ii). \Only if" part. Let P be a homogenous partition into
intervals of size s. If s <
p
g, then s <
g
s
, and a jurisdiction S1 = [0; s] would benet from joining
S2 = [s; 2s]. Indeed, for any t 2 S1 we have
c(t; S1) = jt  s
2
j+ g
s
 jt  sj   js
2
  sj+ g
s
= jt  sj+ g
s
  s
2
< jt  sj+ g
2s
= c(t; S1 [ S2):
Note that in this case all members of S1 [ S2 benet form joining together. Thus, for s < pg
partition P is neither SFM nor CS. 2
We will use Proposition 4.2 to prove the \if" part of Proposition 4.1 (i) and (ii), so we prove
Proposition 4.2 before completing the proof of Proposition 4.1.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. part (i) The \only if" part of Proposition 4.1 (i) implies that if
a heterogeneous P is SFM then it satises BI and consists of intervals of two dierent sizes, s0 and
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s00, where pg  s < s00  2pg and 	(s0) = 	(s00) =   1:5pg. Proposition 4.2 follows from the
following stronger statement:
Proposition B.1: If a consecutive partition P satises BI and
p
g  jSij  2pg for all jurisdictions
Si 2 P , then P is CS.
Proof: If P satises the conditions of Proposition B.1, then it satises BI and hence consists
of intervals of at most two sizes, s0 and s00, where pg  s0  s00  2pg and 	(s0) = 	(s00) =  
1:5
p
g.
Hence, by Remark A.5, we have c(t; P )  1:5pg for any t 2 P . If a jurisdiction S can deviate
under CS, then by Lemma A.8 it has to be an interval. Remark A.3 yields 	(jSj)  c(p; S) <
c(p; P )  1:5pg, where p is a peripheral individual in S. It implies that jSj 2 (pg; 2pg).
By Lemma A.6 we can nd xi and xj , peripheral individuals in jurisdictions in P , such that
that both dierences a1 = jl(S)  xij and a2 = jr(S)  xj j are smaller than 0:1pg. Without loss of
generality, assume that a1  a2. We have S = [l(S); r(S)] = [xi  a1; xj  a2] and i  j. We now
consider the following four possible cases.
CASE 1: i = j. Here jSj = r(S)   l(S)  jl(S)   xij + jr(S)   xij  0:2pg, which contradicts
jSj 2 (pg; 2pg). Hence, this is impossible.
CASE 2: i = j   1, so [xj 1; xj ] = Sj 2 P . Then, given a1  a2, and Remark A.1:
c(l(S); S) = 	(jSj) = 	(sj  a1  a2) > 	(sj)  j  a1  a2j
2
    ja1j = c(l(S); P );
a contradiction to S being a deviating group.
CASE 3: i = j   2. Then, since 	 is increasing on [p2g;+1), we have:
c(l(S); S) = 	(jSj) = 	(sj + sj 1  a1  a2) > 	(sj + sj 1)  j  a1  a2j
2

	(2
p
g)  ja1j = 1:5pg   ja1j     ja1j = c(l(S); P );
a contradiction again. Finally,
CASE 4: j   i  3. Then, jSj  3pg   0:2pg = 2:8pg =2 (pg; 2pg). Hence, this last case is
impossible as well, which completes the proof of both Proposition B.1 and part (i) of Proposition
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4.2. Part (ii) of the latter proposition follows immediately from Proposition 4.5. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.1 (i). \If" part. Again, we will prove a bit stronger statement,
namely:
Proposition B.2: If a consecutive partition P satises BI and
p
g  jSij  2pg for all jurisdictions
Si 2 P , then P is SFM.
Proof: Consider a consecutive P , which satises BI and hence consists of intervals of at most
two sizes, s0 and s00, where by the assumption pg  s0  s00  2pg and so 	(s0) = 	(s00) =  
1:5
p
g. Proposition B.1 guarantees that P is CS.
Assume that P is not SFM. Hence, there exists a group T , and a jurisdiction Si 2 P such that
all members of T prefer T [ Si to T . We can choose T so that T \ Si = ;. We partition T into Tl
and Tr, which lie respectively to the left and to the right of Si = [xi 1; xi]: we have t  xi 1 for all
t 2 Tl, and t  xi for all t 2 Tr.
First, one of Tl and Tr should be empty. Indeed, let T
0 = T [ Si with l(T 0) 2 Tl, r(T 0) 2
Tr. Since both values (l(T
0); T 0; P ) and (r(T 0); T 0; P ) are negative, Lemma A.7 implies that
(t; T 0; P ) < 0 for all t 2 [l(T 0); r(T 0)]. But this means that the group T 0 can deviate by forming
its own jurisdiction, a contradiction to the fact that P is CS.
Now, without loss of generality, assume Tr = ; and T = Tl, T 0 = [l(T 0); xi]. By Remark A.5 we
have 1:5
p
g  c(l(S); P ) > c(l(S); T 0)  	(jT 0j), and so jT 0j < 2pg. Since jSij  pg, we obtain
jT j < pg and so m(T 0) 2 Si.
Next, note that that the individual located at m(T 0) is better o at T 0 than at Si: her tax
contribution declines since jurisdiction becomes larger, and her transportation cost drops to zero.
Thus, (l(T 0); T 0; P ) < 0, (m(T 0); T 0; P ) < 0, and Lemma A.7 implies that (t; T 0; P ) < 0
for all t 2 [l(T 0);m(T 0)]. It tells us that the interval T 00 = [xi 1   jT j; xi 1] = [p; xi 1], with
jT 00j = jT j < pg, also can deviate under SFM by joining the adjacent interval Si.
If jSij = s00, then c(p; Si [ T 00) = 	(jSi [ T 00j) > 	(s00) = 	(s0)  c(l(S); P ), which contradicts
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the assumption that T 00 can deviate under SFM. Hence, jSij = s0.
Furthermore, we have jT 00j < pg, and its left endpoint belongs to Si 1. From Remark A.1 we
obtain:
if p  m(Si 1), then
c(p; T 00 [ Si) = 	
 jT 00 [ Sij = 	(s0 + jT 00j) > 	(s0)  jT 00j =    jT 00j = c(p; Si 1) = c(p; P );
if p  m(Si 1), then also
c(p; T 00 [ Si) = 	
 jT 00 [ Sij = 	(s0 + si 1   (si 1   jT j)) > 	(s0 + si 1)  (si 1   jT j)
	(2
p
g)  (si 1   jT j) =    (si 1   jT j) = c(p; Si 1) = c(p; P ):
Hence, both possibilities contradict the assumption that T 00 can deviate by joining Si under SFM.
This completes the proof of both Proposition B.2 and Proposition 4.1 (i). 2
Proof of Proposition 4.1 (ii). \If" part. Let P be a homogenous partition into intervals
of size s  pg. If pg  s  p2g, then SFM follows from Proposition B.2 above. Let s  p2g.
Suppose that a group T contemplates joining a jurisdiction Si = [(i 1)s; is] 2 P . By Remark A.1,
we have:
c(l(S); T [ Si)  	(jT [ Sij)  	(jsj)  c(l(S); P );
and the individual at l(S) would not benet from this migration. Thus, there are no protable
migrations, and P is SFM. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Let P = fS1; : : : ; Sng = (s1; : : : ; sn) be a size-monotone partition,
with d =
p
2g  s1  : : :  sn. If it is not SAUC, then there exists T  I and Si 2 P , such that
S = T [ Si is preferred to P by all its members.
Let S be such that l(S) 2 Sj 2 P , j  i. Using Remarks A.1 and A.3, we obtain c(l(S); P ) =
c(l(S); Sj)  	(sj)  	(si) < 	(jSj)  c(l(S); S), a contradiction. 2
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Proof of Proposition 4.4. Let P = fS1; : : : ; Sng = (s1; : : : ; sn) = (x1; : : : ; xn 1) be a size-
monotone partition, with d =
p
2g  s1  : : :  sn  2pg. By Remark A.5, c(t; P )  1:5pg for
all t 2 I. If P is not CS, then there exists a group T  I which would be better of by forming its
own jurisdiction. By Lemma A.6, there exist i and j, such that both dierences a1 = jl(S)   xij
and a2 = jr(S)  xj j are smaller than 0:1pg.
Since sk 
p
2g for all Sk 2 P , we have i  j.
If i = j, we get jT j < 0:2pg and c(l(S); T )  gjT j > 1:5
p
g  c(l(S); P ).
If i < j   1, we get jT j > 1:8p2g and c(l(S); T ) > 	(1:8p2g) > 1:5pg  c(l(S); P ).
Both cases contradict the fact that T can benecially deviate under CS, hence it must be
i = j   1. This means that the individuals xi = xj 1 and xj are peripherals of Sj 2 P . Thus,
r(S)  l(S)  sj   0:2pg 
p
2g   0:2pg = (p2  0:2)pg.
Consider two possible cases:
CASE 1: jT j < jSj j = sj . Then c(m(Sj); P ) < c(m(Sj); T ) (the tax of m(Sj) is larger in T ,
while her transportation cost is smaller (zero) at P ), hence m(Sj) 62 T . For the same reason, the
individuals from the half of Sj between m(Sj) and its peripheral individual, which does not contain
m(T ) in its interior, cannot belong to T . This observation yields jT j  sj
2
+ 0:2
p
g  1:2pg.
Moreover,
maxfc(l(S); T ); c(r(S); T )g  jr(S)  l(S)j
2
+
g
jT j 
1
2
(sj   0:2pg) + gsj
2
+ 0:2
p
g
=
sj
4
  0:2pg

+
1
2
sj
2
+ 0:2
p
g

+
g
sj
2
+ 0:2
p
g
=
sj
4
  0:2pg

+	
sj
2
+ 0:2
p
g

:
Since
p
2g  sj  2pg, we have sj
2
+ 0:2
p
g  1:2pg < d, and, given that 	 decreases on [0; d],
we obtain 	
sj
2
+ 0:2
p
g

 	(1:2pg). Thus, we can continue:
maxfc(l(S); T ); c(r(S); T )g 
p
2g
4   0:2
p
g

+	(1:2
p
g) =
p
2
4   0:2
p
g + 0:6
p
g + 11:2
p
g
=
p
2
4 + 0:4 +
5
6
p
g = 15
p
2+74
60
p
g > 1:5
p
g = max
t2I
c(t; P ):
This contradicts the fact that l(S) joins the deviating group T .
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CASE 2: jT j  jSj j = sj . Since jl(S)   xj 1j  0:1pg, we have l(S) 2 Sj or l(S) 2 Sj 1, so
p
2g  jSl(S)j  jT j. Hence, c(l(S); T )  	(jT j)  	(Sl(S)) = c(l(S); Sl(S)) = c(l(S); P ), so the
individual l(S) does not improve from P to T . This contradiction proves our proposition. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.5. Since any homogenous consecutive partition satises BI, Lemma
A.8 applies, so P is CS if no interval can deviate.
Part (i), n > 1; \only if". We have already checked (see the proof of Proposition 4.1 (ii),
\only if" part), that for s <
p
g our partition will not be CS.
If s > (2 +
p
2)
p
g, then T =
h
x1  
p
g
2 ; x1 +
p
g
2
i
, the interval of the size
p
g centered in one
of the peripheral points of P would benet from deviation. Indeed, among the members of T , the
individual x1  
p
g
2 has the largest cost in T and the smallest cost in P , but still
c(x1  
p
g
2
; P ) = 	(s) 
p
g
2
>
1 +
p
2
2
p
g +
p
g
2 +
p
2
= 1:5
p
g = c(x1  
p
g
2
):
Part (i), n > 1; \if". If s 2 [pg; 2pg] then Proposition B.1 (utilized in the proof of Proposition
4.2 above) guarantees that P is CS. Let s 2 (2pg; [2 +p2]pg], so that 1:5  	(s)  2pg, and let
T = [l(S); r(S)] be a deviating interval.
Similarly to Lemma A.6, there exist peripheral (relative to jurisdictions in P ) individuals xi
and xj , such that jl(S)   xij; jr(S)   xj j < 0:6pg. Indeed, without loss of generality assume
l(S) 2 Si = [xi 1; xi] 2 P , l(S)  m(Si). Then: jl(S)   xij = c(xi; Si)   c(l(S); Si) = 	(s)  
c(l(S); P ) < 2
p
g   1:4pg = 0:6pg:
Now, since 2
p
g  s, we have i  j.
If i = j, then assume l(S) 2 Si (if not, then r(S) 2 Si+1 and we do the same argument for
c(r(S); Si+1) ). We then obtain the following contradiction with T deviating protably:
c(l(S); Si) = 	(s)  jxi   pij < 	(s)  0:6pg  1:4pg = 4230
p
g;
c(l(S); T )  	(jT j)  	(1:2pg) = 4330
p
g:
If i < j, then we can assume without loss of generality that a1 = jl(S)   xij  a2 = jr(S)   xj j.
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Using Remark A.1, we again obtain a contradiction with T protably deviating:
c(l(S); T ) = 	(jT j) = 	((j   i)s a1  a2) > 	(s)  j  a1  a2j
2
 	(s)  ja1j = c(l(S); P ):
This completes the proof of part (i).
Part (ii), n = 1. Let P = fIg, and let T = [l(S); r(S)] 2 I benet from its deviation. Without
loss of generality, m(T ) < m(I) = 12 . First, if r(S)  12 , then individual r(S) would be worse at T
than at I (both her tax and transportation cost would increase). Hence, r(S) < 12 .
Then T 0 = [0; r(S)  l(S)] = [0; p] also can deviate under CS. Indeed, for every individual t 2 T 0
we have c(t; T 0) = c(t + l(S); T ) < c(t + l(S); I)  c(t; I). Next, if T 0 = [0; p], where p < 12 , can
deviate under CS, then (since members of T 0 pay tax of at least 2g) 2g < c(t; T 0) < c(t; I)  12 + g,
which implies g < 12 . Hence, for g  12 partition I = fIg will be CS.
Further, interval T 0 = [0; p] can deviate if and only if (t; T 0; fIg) < 0 for all t 2 T 0. But
(t; T 0; fIg) = c(t; T 0)  c(t; I) =

	(p) 	(1); 0  t  p2
	(p) 	(1) + (2t  p); p2  t  p
is increasing on [0; p], hence, T = [0; p] can deviate if and only if (p; T; fIg) < 0. Now
(p; T; fIg) = c(p; T 0)  c(p; I) =

p
2
+
g
p

 

1
2
  p+ g

=  

1
2
+ g

+

3
2
p+
g
p

:
For given g, this function is a convex in p, and attains its minimum at p =
p
2g=3. Hence,
the existence of at least one interval [0; p] that can protably deviate is ensured if and only if
(p; [0; p]; fIg) < 0. Finally,
(p; [0; p]; fIg) =  

1
2
+ g

+
0@3
2
r
2g
3
+
gq
2g
3
1A =p6g   1
2
+ g

;
so, indeed, P = fIg is not CS if and only if g > 1
2
and
p
6g   g   1
2
< 0, pg < 1
2 +
p
6
. 2
Note that the condition in part (ii) of Proposition 4.5 also gives a necessary and sucient
conditions for (core) stability of a given jurisdiction Si 2 P against threats from inside, i.e. against
potentially seceding jurisdictions S  Si.
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